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Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing
Private Sector Employers
What do IBM, Boeing, General Motors, Ford Motor Company, Alcoa,
Boise Cascade, Toyota, Greyhound Lines, and American Airlines have in com-
mon? Each of these companies currently uses drug testing to screen either cur-
rent or potential employees, or both.1 They are not alone. Approximately 25
percent of the Fortune 500 companies are now using drug tests on employees,
2
an increase of 250 percent in just three years.3 Dr. Michael Walsh of the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse predicts that number will double in the coming
year.4 But as more and more companies implement drug testing programs,
some lawyers are predicting that employers will encounter an increasing number
of legal challenges. 5 For example, San Francisco Supervisor Bill Maher, who
co-sponsored that city's ordinance prohibiting drug screening except in cases of
public safety, predicts that "[iut's going to be a major [national] battle over pri-
vacy and what corporate America can do to employees."
6
To understand why so many employers are turning to drug testing, one
need look no further than the statistics on drug abuse in the United States. Ac-
cording to a survey by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, between ten and
twenty-three percent of all workers use drugs at work.7 Ninety percent of peo-
ple who use cocaine use it during work hours and approximately one-half actu-
ally buy and sell the drug while on the job.8 The report concluded: " '[D]rug
abuse is the most common health hazard in the American workplace.' " The
results of on-the-job impairment can be staggering-and deadly. The costs to
industry in lost productivity from employee drug and alcohol abuse is estimated
at 100 billion dollars in 1986.10 Furthermore, over a nine-year period drug and
alcohol use was implicated in thirty-seven deaths in the railroad industry.II
For more and more employers the answer to the drug problem is drug test-
ing, often by urinalysis, of current employees, applicants for employment, or
both. The introduction of the EMIT test has made drug testing by means of
urinalysis a simpler and less expensive process, 12 contributing to the growing
1. Englade, Who's Hired and Who's Fired, STUDENT LAW., Apr. 1986, at 20, 22.
2. Angarola, Protect Safety, Not Drug Abuse, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 35, 35.
3. Englade, supra note 1, at 22.
4. Marcotte, Drugs at Work, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 34, 34.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 35.
7. D. Copus, Alcohol and Drugs in the Workplace 1 (Aug. 8, 1986) (unpublished manuscript
available from the National Employment Law Institute).
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at I (quoting National Institute on Drug Abuse report).
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 4.
12. The Syva Company of Palo Alto, California introduced the EMIT Cannabinoid Assay (the
EMIT Test) in 1980. "Tests developed prior to Emit require a greater degree of technical sophistica-
tion than Emit, and are more expensive and less convenient to use on a large scale." Comment, Your
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prevalence of drug screening in the employment context. 13 This Note briefly
discusses the differences between public sector (governmental unit) employment
and employment in the private sector, where employers have far greater latitude
in instituting and conducting drug testing. The remainder of the Note focuses
on private sector employment issues and includes public sector cases only to the
extent they raise concerns that may be relevant to private sector employers. The
Note then considers the drug testing process step by step from the implementa-
tion decision to the problem of dealing with the employee who tests positive.
The Note concludes by suggesting that employers should carefully consider their
reasons for implementing a drug testing program. If they do not, employers
may needlessly enter into a practice that risks liability and expensive litigation
and that may serve only to chill the atmosphere of employer-employee relations.
Legal challenges to employee drug testing in general are grounded in five
legal areas: the right to privacy, the right to be free from unreasonable searches,
the right to due process, negligence law, and contract law.' 4 Because public
sector employers are governmental entities, they are subject to constitutional
constraints on their policies that do not restrict private employers. 15 Thus, pro-
tections available to public sector employees may be available to a lesser extent
in the private sector, if at all.
The challenge that critics of drug testing raise most often is that testing
violates an employee's right to privacy. "An individual's personal belief con-
cerning those aspects of his life which are private and which should not be sub-
jected involuntarily to intrusion by others creates a much larger zone than that
which the Constitution legally protects."' 16 As Justice Blackmun wrote in Roe v.
Wade:
17
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy....
[T]he Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guar-
antee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Consti-
tution.... [O]nly personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental"
or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy.'
8
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy only in
certain limited areas such as marriage and procreation. 19 Even in these limited
Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19 LoY.
L.A.L. REv. 1451, 1455 n.26 (1986).
13. Comment, supra note 12, at 1456.
14. L. DOGOLoFF & R. ANGAROLA, URINE TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 12 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter L. DOGOLOFF].
15. "Most of the protections for individual rights and liberties contained in the Constitution
and its amendments apply only to the actions of governmental entities." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTUIONAL LAW 497 (2d ed. 1983). Similarly, the Bill of Rights "has been
viewed only to limit the freedom of government when dealing with individuals" and the amendments
to the Constitution that protect individual liberties "specifically address themselves to actions by the
United States or a state." Id.
16. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 13.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
19. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives). But cf.
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areas the Constitution protects only against governmental intrusions and not
against intrusions by private parties.20 The Constitution's implicit privacy guar-
antees, therefore, do not protect private sector employees from drug testing,
although privacy rights guaranteed by some state constitutions arguably may
limit or bar drug testing in public and private employment. 21
Parallel to the argument that drug testing is a violation of the right to pri-
vacy is the argument that drug testing, including both blood and urine testing,
constitutes a search and seizure that, if unreasonable, is prohibited under the
fourth amendment. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has held that tak-
ing a blood sample does constitute a search and seizure under the fourth amend-
ment and is unreasonable absent probable cause.22 Other courts have
determined that requiring a subject to give a urine sample also constitutes a
search. 23 Again, however, the Constitution protects only against unreasonable
search and seizure by the government, so a private sector employer's drug or
alcohol testing program will not violate an employee's right to be free from un-
reasonable searches.
24
A third constitutional objection often raised by public employees involves
the fifth and fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process. Employees argue
that the tests are inaccurate and insufficiently related to performance and there-
fore are not sufficient grounds on which to deprive an employee of his or her job.
Employees also argue that dismissal based on test results, without a hearing in
which the employee can refute the charges, deprives the employee of his or her
procedural rights.25 Although the right to due process and other federal consti-
tutional rights technically protect only government workers, private employers
might take into consideration the standards placed on public employers in plan-
ning and conducting their own testing programs. 26 If a private employer's test-
ing program is challenged, judges and arbitrators may be consciously or
unconsciously swayed by constituional considerations.
Beyond these constitutional bases for protesting drug screening, which gen-
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (Court refused to extend privacy protection to private
consensual homosexual activity).
20. See supra note 15.
21. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1453-55. "The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable intrusion by government. The California Con-
stitution extends this protection by limiting intrusion by anyone, including business interests, to cir-
cumstances where there is a compelling public interest." Id. at 1454.
22. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (involving taking of blood sample
from a drunk driving suspect against the suspect's wishes).
23. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Allen v. City of Mari-
etta, 601 F. Supp. 482,489 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 54647, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
24. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 112-13. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Burling-
ton N. R.R., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2739, 2740 (D. Mont. 1984), the federal district court noted in
dicta that "nothing prohibit[s] aprivate entity from requiring any person, including an employee, to
submit to a 'search'" as a requisite to admission to the employer's premises.
25. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 15.
26. For a case involving a public sector employer in which the court found a drug test to
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment, see Jones v. McKenzie,
628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
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erally do not inhibit private employers, employees may have challenges that ap-
ply equally to public sector and private sector employers based on claims of
negligence and violation of contractual rights. Areas of particular concern for
the private employer as well as specific cases will be considered below in the
context of the testing process.
Because of the possible challenges to drug testing, before implementing a
program an employer must consider the questions of who will be tested and in
what manner. The employer might choose to test all applicants for employment
or to limit testing to current employees only. For current employees, testing
could be "retrospective," which means that employees are tested only after a
supervisor or fellow employee reports abnormal behavior, or following an acci-
dent or other incident.27 Some employers make testing part of periodic medical
examinations, with or without the employee's knowledge; others test employees
from time to time entirely at random.28
The testing approach adopted depends in part on the employee and the
nature of the job. In cases involving challenges to drug testing in the public
sector, judicial approval is influenced by the determination of whether or not the
particular job or jobs involved are "critical"-that is, jobs involving public
safety or hazardous machinery or conditions.2 9 In the private sector 30 the law-
fulness of random testing (as opposed to retrospective testing) for noncritical
jobs is being challenged in a case pending in California, 31 although no court has
yet ruled on the issue.3 2 At least one court, however, has criticized in dicta the
use of random testing in noncritical jobs. In IBEW, Local 900 v. Potomac Elec-
tric3 3 a federal district court judge described a proposed random blood and urine
testing program for noncritical utility company employees as a "drastic" and
"draconian" measure.3 4 The judge continued:
I don't denigrate at all the importance [of the employer's business], but
that does not mean that it's vital that these drastic measures must be
impressed on everyone [through random testing of noncritical employ-
ees], including clerks and secretaries, or even on anyone. On the other
27. L. DOGOLOpi, supra note 14, at 30.
28. L. DOOLOrs, supra note 14, at 30-31.
29. Borsari v. Federal Aviation Admin., 699 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir.) (air traffic controllers),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(high voltage power line workers).
30. To authorize a warrantless search of an employee in the public sector courts will require
that the employer have a "sufficiently rational justification" to suspect the test subject and that the
purpose of the search be connected to "the protection of public welfare and property." Everett v.
Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481, 1485 (N.D. Ga. 1986). Random searches of noncritical public employ-
ees arguably fail both requirements. "Random" indicates that an employee is tested without a "suffi-
ciently rational justification," and the danger posed to "public welfare and property" by an alcohol-
or drug-intoxicated employee in a noncritical job-one by definition not involving public safety or
hazardous conditions-is small to nonexistent. One commentator concluded, "Public employers
may not conduct random tests of employees in non-critical jobs." D. Copus, supra note 7, at 37.
31. See D. Copus, supra note 7, at 42 (discussing Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No.
843230 (San Fran. Super. Ct.)).
32. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 41.
33. 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3071 (D.D.C. 1986).
34. Id. at 3072-73.
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hand, it's clear that plaintiffs [employees] will be severely injured.
Pending outcome of the arbitration they must undergo invasions of
privacy which are almost unheard of in a free society or they will be
summarily fired .... The drug menace is certainly a terrible menace
as the court is well aware... but that does not mean that we must
resort to hysterical measures .... 35
Another judge, however, later refused to grant a preliminary injunction en-
joining the program pending arbitration.
36
The critical versus noncritical job distinction has been drawn by commenta-
tors as well.3 7 "For certain job classifications it is prudent to err on the side of
public safety, even at the expense of individual privacy," s38 but "while a screen-
ing program for airline pilots or chemical plant operators might be justifiable, a
program for clerical or retail employees would not."'3 9 Employers might thus
seek to achieve a balance between electing to screen all employees regardless of
job classification and choosing to abandon screening as an invasion of employee
privacy. 40
For the private sector employer the decisions of who and when to test are
mostly unfettered. Although some courts and commentators have questioned
the justification for random testing of employees holding noncritical jobs, private
employers are free to conduct such testing. Employers have even greater lati-
tude in mandating testing for job applicants as opposed to current employees.41
For employers who have unionized workers, however, policy and planning is
more restricted.
Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)42 require that employers bargain in good faith with unions on issues
involving wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Although the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has not yet considered the issue, the im-
plementation of a drug screening program arguably is a condition of
employment and thus a mandatory subject of bargaining.43 In a case involving
provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA)44 similar to those of the NLRA, a
Montana federal district court ruled that the employer railroad could not unilat-
erally and without proper notice or negotiation impose a strict screening pro-
35. Id.
36. IBEW, Local 1900 v. PEPCO, 634 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986).
37. See, eg., Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs. A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 422 (1985-86).
38. Id. at 425.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 425-26.
41. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 33. Once a person is employed he or she has certain implicit or
explicit rights (freedom from wrongful discharge) arising under the contract of employment and the
employer is under certain implicit or explicit constraints (requirement of just cause for dismissal).
See infra notes 93-112 and accompanying text. The applicant, without a contract, does not have
these protections.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b)(3), (d) (1982).
43. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 82; see Rothstein, supra note 37, at 430-31.
44. 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 156 (1982).
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gram on union members.45
In addition to any legal constraints imposed on an employer in designing a
drug policy, the employer should carefully consider all aspects of such a policy
before beginning drug testing. The policy should be well-planned, written, and
available to employees and applicants in advance. Unfortunately, some employ-
ers have given scant consideration to these concerns in their haste to battle the
drug problem. As a result, there is a pressing need for guidelines for employers
presently planning, implementing, or conducting an employee drug screening
program.
46
Once a drug testing policy has been designed and adopted, the employer
must decide on a method of testing. With the introduction of cheaper and sim-
pler urine tests, employee drug testing in its various forms has become a 100-
million-dollar-a-year business.47 Currently on the market, in addition to blood
and urine tests, are tests for saliva and a machine that purports to scan brain
waves. 48 Most testing, however, is conducted with blood and urine; urinalysis is
by far the most popular testing method.
4 9
All of these tests share one important drawback. In contrast to the familiar
breathalyzer test for alcohol, drug tests do not measure the level of impairment.
Drug concentrations in urine or blood, as opposed to alcohol levels, cannot be
correlated with the degree to which the test subject is impaired. In addition, no
currently available test can accurately measure the recency of drug use.50 This
drawback has important implications for employee screening.
51
The inability to ascertain recency of drug use or the degree of impair-
ment means that a confirmed positive drug test cannot be used to es-
tablish that an employee used drugs while on the job, was under the
influence of drugs while on the job, or was impaired by drugs while on
the job. A confirmed positive drug test may mean only that the em-
45. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Burlington N. R.R., 620 F. Supp. 163 (D. Mont.
1985). Burlington Northern (BN) had a longstanding rule against on-the-job impairment due to use
of alcohol or drugs. Until the implementation of the new enforcement procedure that gave rise to
the case, the railroad had enforced the rule through supervisor observation. After a rise in the
number of accidents, BN enacted a new policy of random searches by trained dogs and physical
searches of any suspected employee. The court held that
[t]he mere absence of any reference in the collective bargaining agreement to a particular
method of enforcement or detection, standing alone, does not establish that the method
which may be utilized to detect violations is a matter within the prerogative of manage-
ment. Rather, the conspicuous absence may simply reflect the fact that a particular
method, satisfactorily tolerable to both sides, has existed over time.
Id. at 169 (citation omitted).
46. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 424.
47. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 424.
48. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 25.
49. "Since its development in 1980, [the EMIT urine test] has become the most widely used
drug test; it is the easiest to administer and least expensive (between $4.00-$22.00, depending on the
number of drug classes tested for)." D. Copus, supra note 7, at 27. For an extensive discussion of
the technical aspects of urinalysis and the resulting implications for reliability of and appropriate use
of test results, see Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results for the Purpose
of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 391 (1984).
50. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 25; see Rothstein, supra note 37, at 424.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
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ployee used drugs on his own private time away from work and suf-
fered no impairment of his work from such drug use.
5 2
In light of these limitations, a positive test result can be safely relied on only to
show that the test subject may have used, or in the case of marijuana, may have
been in the presence of someone using,53 the indicated drug in some unspecified
recent time period. This assumes, however, that the test was performed
correctly.
Recent studies cast doubt on the likelihood that testing has been performed
correctly. The Centers for Disease Control of the Department of Health and
Human Services recently completed a nine-year study of thirteen laboratories to
determine the reliability of evidence of drug use and concluded that the testing
showed remarkably high error rates.54 Although the Centers for Disease Con-
trol study revealed high error rates in testing performed by trained technicians
under laboratory conditions, availability of drug screen kits that allow on-site
performance of testing, often by untrained personnel, suggests even greater po-
tential for error. As one commentator wrote, "Equipped with a $300 kit, Acme
Company's deputy assistant personnel trainee can go into the restroom and at-
tempt to become an instant toxicologist."'5 5 The most widely used urinalysis
system, the EMIT Drug Detection System,
56 is an on-site testing system.5 7
Although on-site testing often is less expensive and provides results more
quickly,58 confidentiality may be a problem, chemicals must be maintained, and
the likelihood of operator error is increased. 59 Manufacturers recommend a sec-
ond test by an alternative method for all positive test results even if the first test
is performed under the more reliable conditions of a laboratory.60 A more so-
phisticated, and therefore more expensive, technique for the second, or confir-
52. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 26. For an explanation of why testing procedures are limited in
this respect, see Comment, supra note 12, at 1456-60.
53. There is some controversy whether passive exposure to marijuana smoke will cause a sub-
ject to test positive. See Rothstein, supra note 37, at 426 (indicating that passive exposure may lead
to positive test results) (citing Zeidenberg, Bourdon, & Nahas, Marijuana Intoxication by Passive
Inhalation: Documentation by Detection of Urinary Metabolites, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 76 (1977)).
But see D. Copus, supra note 7, at 27-28 (indicating that positive test results are unlikely to result
from passive exposure) (citing Centers for Disease Control, Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Urine
Testing for Detection of Mariuana: An Advisory, 32 MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
467, 470 (1983)).
54. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 426-27 (citing Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing,
253 J. A.M.A. 2382 (1985)). In testing, a false positive is an incorrect report that the subject had
used drugs when he or she was actually drug-free; a false negative occurs when the lab reports a
negative result when the specimen in fact contained evidence of drug use. The study found a higher
percentage of false negatives than of false positives. Id.
55. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 427.
56. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
57. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 21.
58. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 21. On-site testing eliminates the time necessary for sam-
ples to be shipped to the lab and tested before obtaining the results.
59. L. DoGoLOFF, supra note 14, at 21.
60. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 22; Comment, supra note 12, at 1460 (citing SYvA Co.,
MARIJUANA AND THE EMIT CANNABINOID ASSAY (1981)); see also Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.
Supp. 1214, 1221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (affirming a state court injunction against the use of EMIT test
results for prison inmates " 'unless accompanied by evidence that the positive result was confirmed
by an alternative method of analysis' ") (quoting Kane v. Fair, No. 136229, slip. op. at 9 (Super. Ct.
Mass. Aug. 5, 1983)).
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mation, test is preferred. 61
A key component of any drug screening program is the laboratory that
performs the testing, whether the lab performs both the initial and second tests
or only the confirmation test.62 The employer should cooperate with the labora-
tory to establish a forensic protocol that includes a rigorous chain of custody to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the body fluid sample is maintained
throughout the collection, shipping, testing, and storage process.63 One impor-
tant part of establishing chain of custody is the formal record keeping necessary
to track the sample throughout the process to ensure the identity of the sample;
the second major factor in chain of custody is ensuring the integrity of the sam-
ple itself.64
When testing is performed by blood sampling, ensuring sample integrity is
relatively simple because qualified medical personnel are required to draw the
blood. In fact, blood tests in general are more reliable and more accurate, pro-
viding better evidence of possible impairment than urinalysis. 65 In Schmerber v.
California,66 however, the United States Supreme Court characterized blood
testing as a potential violation of "fundamental human interests" as it involves
"intrusions beyond the body's surface." 67 The Court noted that a blood test
subject could possibly be "one of the few who on grounds of fear, concern for
health, or religious scruple" object to having a blood sample taken. 68 Thus,
although blood testing has chain of custody advantages over urinalysis, it has
several drawbacks in other areas.
Urinalysis presents chain of custody problems not encountered with blood
testing. The only sure way to guarantee the integrity of the urine sample is to
have a witness observe the subject while he or she provides the specimen. Other-
wise, the subject could adulterate the specimen (with water or other substance
that may or may not be detectable during testing) or actually substitute a speci-
men provided by another, presumably drug-free, person.69 The need for such
observation has prompted one court to note that "[a] compelling argument can
be made that... urine testing... presents an even greater intrusion of privacy
than does blood testing."70 The possibility also exists that such an observer or
other drug screening agent could act in an improper fashion (intentional or neg-
ligent tortious conduct) thus leading to employer liability. Coercion or force
61. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 22.
62. L. DOGOLOF', supra note 14, at 26.
63. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 33.
64. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 33.
65. L. DoGoLoFF, supra note 14, at 25.
66. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
67. Id. at 769-70; see also Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (D.N.J. 1985) (blood
test more intrusive than urinalysis or breathalyzer), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 577 (1986).
68. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added). In Schmerber the Court found that defend-
ant did not fall into one of these categories. Id.
69. L. DOGOLOFF, supra note 14, at 28.
70. Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 549, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)
("Drawing blood is at most a benign procedure. No embarrassment is involved [as is involved with
the providing of a urine sample in the presence of a witness].").
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exercised by an employer's agent can lead to charges of assault and battery,
7 1
false imprisonment, 72 negligence, 73 or intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress74 against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Whichever method or methods of screening an employer chooses, the labo-
ratory should be selected carefully. An employer should have contact with the
testing facility itself to the greatest degree possible to eliminate unnecessary steps
in the chain of custody. In other words, employers should avoid persons or
businesses that hold themselves out as intermediaries and should deal directly
with the laboratory. Many organizations 75 and state agencies7 6 have accredita-
tion programs under which laboratories are evaluated; the Department of De-
fense reviews laboratories as part of its drug screening program. 77 Use of those
labs may make the testing more reliable and, therefore, less vulnerable to chal-
lenge. Employers should recognize, however, the drawbacks associated with the
various testing methods and understand the limitations inherent in all drug
screening with current technology when reviewing claims made by various par-
ticipants in the increasingly competitive drug test market.
After the employer has decided on a method of testing and has instituted
the drug testing policy, it must determine a plan of action for handling positive
test results. No action or report should be based on an initial positive test; a
positive test indicates only the need for a second, confirmatory test.78 Further-
more, test results should not be reported either orally or in writing to any person
outside the company under any circumstances not explicitly required by law,
and should be restricted internally on a stringent "need-to-know" basis. 79 The
purpose behind a need-to-know rule is not only to protect the employee's job
and reputation, but also to limit potential liability for the employer.
Especially in the context of disseminating drug test results, an employer
may face liability for defamation or slander. In Houston Belt & Terminal Rail-
way Co. v. Wherry8° defendant Railroad received a preliminary report (from a
first test) concerning plaintiff Wherry which stated that Wherry's urinalysis was
71. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 57; see also State v. Hamilton, No. H49547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
August 20, 1985) (employer held liable for improper actions of polygraph examiner who fondled
female applicants and asked questions of a sexual nature). Also, when blood testing is involved the
possibility of injury to the employee during the drawing of the blood sample and thus possible liabil-
ity on the part of the employer exists.
72. See, eg., Black v. Kroger Co., 527 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
73. See, eg., Armstrong v. Morgan, 545 S.W.2d 45, 46-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
74. See, e.g., Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 495-96, 340 S.E.2d 116,
123-24, disc review denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986). For a discussion of Hogan, see
Note, Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co.: Workers' Compensation and Mental Injuries, 65 N.C.L.
REv. 816 (1987).
75. The College of American Pathologists sponsors both a comprehensive Interlaboratory
Comparison Program and a Laboratory Accreditation Program. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 32.
76. The California Department of Health Services sponsors a blind testing system for labs en-
gaged in drug urinalysis. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 32.
77. Despite a rigorous review system, however, in 1984 the United States Army informed at
least 60,000 soldiers who had been told originally that their tests were positive that their test results
may have been wrong. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 32.
78. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 429; see supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
79. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 56.
80. 548 S.W.2d 743 (rex. Civ. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
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"methadone positive, a trace" and that "methadone [is] used usually in treating
heroin addicts." 81 The doctor who delivered the report told the Railroad's
agent "that a trace is a minute amount and that one test is not enough to indi-
cate that Wherry was a drug user."' 82 Despite the doctor's warning and without
ordering a second test, the Railroad's agent orally and in writing informed a
number of company officials that Wherry's test showed that he was a drug ad-
dict and thus was in violation of the Railroad's rule prohibiting the use of alco-
hol and narcotics.83 After learning of the report, Wherry had another test
performed. The second test "revealed the presence of a compound whose char-
acteristics resembled methadone, but ... further analysis showed that the com-
pound was not methadone or any of the commonly employed drugs of abuse."
'84
The Railroad received the results of this second test but dismissed Wherry any-
way.85 The Railroad's agent later repeated the accusations of drug addiction to
a United States Department of Labor employee.8 6 In Wherry's defamation ac-
tion the jury awarded him 150,000 dollars compensatory and 50,000 dollars ex-
emplary damages.
8 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently consid-
ered a defamation charge in the drug-testing context in O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of
America, Inc..88 In O'Brien plaintiff employee, a supervisor, alleged that due to
a personal grudge defendant employer had forced him to take a polygraph test in
an effort to uncover incriminating evidence of drug use as a cover for what
would have been an otherwise invalid dismissal.8 9 Giving plaintiff's failure of
the polygraph test on the questions of drug use as the sole reason, defendant
employer dismissed plaintiff.90 The jury found that plaintiff's allegations of a
personal grudge were in fact true, and that defendant's employees had made a
defamatory statement when they reported that O'Brien had been dismissed
solely for drug use when in fact another reason was involved.9 1 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the award to plaintiff.92 Wherry and O'Brien illustrate that
potential liability for defamation dictates careful handling of test results.
When the test results are positive and a second test confirms that the em-
ployee has used drugs, the employer must decide whether to discharge the em-
ployee or to take less drastic action. As is the case with the imposition of drug
screening programs, private sector employers generally are free to exercise their
own judgment in dealing with an employee whose test results are positive.
Employers have their greatest decisionmaking latitude with employees-at-
81. Id. at 746.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 746-47.
84. Id. at 746.
85. Id. at 746-47.
86. Id. at 747.
87. Id. at 743.
88. 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).
89. Id. at 1070-72.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1077.
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will. Under common law "when a contract of employment does not fix a defi-
nite term the employment is terminable without cause at the will of either
party."' 93 North Carolina and other states, however, have limited the common-
law at-will doctrine by recognizing a claim for wrongful discharge on the part of
at-will employees who were discharged by their employers for reasons contrary
to public policy. 94 In Perkins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,95 for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized a Pennsylvania
statute limiting polygraph use by employers as a legislative statement of public
policy and approved a wrongful discharge action by an employee who had been
dismissed for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination. Thus, an employee
discharged for having a positive drug test or for refusing to take a drug test
might challenge the test as a violation of public policy. For example, the Cali-
fornia Constitution contains an explicit privacy guarantee9 6 that the California
Court of Appeal has declared protects against business and other private sector
intrusions as well as governmental intrusions. 97 A California employee could
point to the privacy guarantee as an expression of public policy on which to
challenge testing as a privacy violation. 98
Employees may be able to challenge an employer's policy of dismissing
drug abusers generally as contrary to public policy. The Federal Rehabilitation
Act of 197399 prohibits employment discrimination against handicapped indi-
viduals by the federal government, government contractors, and recipients of
federal funds. The term "handicapped individual" means "any person who
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
93. Sides v. Duke Hospital, 74 N.C. App. 331, 336, 328 S.E.2d 818, 823, disc. review denied,
314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985). For a discussion of Sides see Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A
Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-Will Rule, 64 N.C.L. REv. 840 (1986).
94. In Sides the North Carolina Court of Appeals arguably approved a wrongful discharge
cause of action for dismissals contrary to public policy. Plaintiff nurse in Sides alleged that she was
dismissed by Duke Hospital for refusing to commit perjury in her testimony in a medical malprac-
tice action involving the hospital. Id. at 335, 328 S.E.2d at 822. But see Hogan v. Forsyth Country
Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (limiting Sides), disc. review denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346
S.E.2d 141 (1986).
California was the first jurisdiction to recognize a claim for wrongful discharge. See Peterman
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 166 Cal. App. 2d 766, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). Many
other jurisdictions have since recognized this cause of action. See, eg., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (quality control director discharged for insistence
that employer comply with federal and state food, drug, and cosmetics laws); Parnar v. Americana
Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982) (employee discharged to prevent testimony before
grand jury or any subsequent criminal trial); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978) (employee discharged for efforts to make employer comply with state and federal consumer
protection credit laws).
95. 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
96. Under Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution "[a]l people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § I (emphasis added).
97. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842
(1976). "Privacy is protected not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right
which may not be violated by anyone." Id.
98. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1477-83.
99. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1985).
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(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."l0 Specific language dealing
with alcoholics and drug abusers was added in the 1978 amendments to the Act:
[The term "handicapped individual"] does not include any individual
who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or
drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or
drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of
others.ol
In a case decided under the law as it stood prior to the 1978 amendments,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that
"[i]ndividuals with current problems or histories of drug abuse qualify as 'handi-
capped individuals' under the definition unless their addiction or prior use can
be shown to prevent successful performance of their jobs."10 2 Although the new
language did not apply, the court continued: "[e]ven if we were to apply the new
definition adopted in 1978, our conclusion would be the same for that defini-
tion .... ,"103 The test, apparently, depends on showing that a person with a
chemical dependency is limited in "one or more" of his or her "major life activi-
ties," but still able to "[perform] the duties of the job in question" and not be a
threat to the "safety of others."'104 An occasional user might be unable to make
the requisite showing of limitation of major life activities.' 0 5 Aside from appli-
cability of the Act to a particular plaintiff, the Act in general, or a similar state
law, 10 6 arguably may be a persuasive statement of public policy on which to base
a wrongful discharge claim.
A company's internal guarantees may, in some cases, be involved in a claim
for wrongful discharge. In Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp. 107 IBM discharged
plaintiff for her romantic involvement with a competitor's employee.' 0 8 The
California Court of Appeal noted that "[i]t is clear that.., company policy
insures to the employee both the right of privacy and the right to hold a job even
though 'off-the-job behavior' might not be approved of by the employee's man-
ager."' 10 9 The Court noted also that the internal policy was reinforced by the
100. Id. § 706(7)(b) (emphasis added).
101. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a)(6), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85 (1978) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(b) (1980)).
102. Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 1226, 1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980) (dicta).
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
105. See McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claim was dismissed because they failed to show that their use of
marijuana impaired them in major life activities).
106. The North Carolina Handicapped Persons Act has the same language with regard to "ma-
jor life activities" that is found in the federal statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(4) (Supp. 1985).
In place of the 1978 federal amendment language pertaining to substance abusers, however, the
North Carolina statute specifically excludes from the definition of handicap "active alcoholism or
drug addiction or abuse." Id. § 168A-3(4)a.
107. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
108. Id. at 245-46, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
109. Id. at 249, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
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California constitution's privacy guarantee. 110 The court affirmed the jury's
award of 100,000 dollars compensatory and 200,000 dollars punitive damages
for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress.11 1 Signif-
icantly, current drug tests cannot distinguish use that was off-the-job or that did
not affect performance on-the-job.
1 12
For employees who are covered by union contracts or contracts for a spe-
cific term of years (that is, not "at-will" employees), dismissals may be subject to
arbitration for a determination of whether the employer had "just cause" for
discharge. Such arbitration often is required by collective bargaining agree-
ments. If there is no provision for arbitration, an employee may simply sue the
employer for breach of contract. One arbitrator has noted that in recent years
almost two-thirds of drug-related discharges have been set aside in arbitra-
tion.1 13 One commentator has noted:
In viewing the issue of workplace search and investigative measures as
a whole, it appears that the employer obtains maximum legal protec-
tion if the employee and the appropriate bargaining representative
have been given sufficient advance notice of the existence of investiga-
tive policies and practices. In the arbitration setting, those reviewing
discipline or discharge grievances look to see that employees have been
made aware of existing policies and if the policy is limited to those
measures reasonably necessary to ensure workplace safety.1 1 4
In other words, employees should be aware of any rules against drug use and
whether such rules cover drug use outside the workplace. Although a rule may
on its face apply only to on-premises drug use, if drug testing is performed off-
premises, off-hours use becomes a factor as well. Therefore, notice requirements
include that employees be informed that they may or will be subject to testing to
enforce drug policies. Employees should also be aware of and understand the
penalties attached to positive testing; it is important that all employees receive
notice and are treated equally.
115
In addition to notice, the reasonableness of the rule proscribing conduct is a
factor in a "just cause" determination. Generally, off-premises drug use is not
just cause for discharge unless the employee's on-the-job performance is af-
fected. 116 Moreover, rules prohibiting drug use may be compared to the em-
ployer's policy concerning on-premises alcohol use and intoxication to challenge
equality of treatment. Some arbitrators have sustained dismissals despite em-
110. Id. at 255, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 534. For a discussion of this guarantee, see supra notes 96-98
and accompanying text.
111. Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
112. See supra text accompanying note 52.
113. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1261, 1265 (1983).
114. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LABOR L. J. 42, 47 (1985) (em-
phasis added).
115. In one case involving alcohol use the arbitrator reversed the discharge of three employees
because the rule prohibiting on-premises consumption or intoxication was known to some, but not to
all employees. "[E]qual treatment under the rule means that everyone must know about the rule and
the manner in which it will be enforced." In re Western Paper Box, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 917, 921
(1983).
116. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 94.
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ployer policies that treat persons using illegal substances differently from per-
sons using alcohol merely on the grounds that using alcohol is legal and using
drugs is not.1 17 Other arbitrators, however, question employers' justifications
for meting out a "slap on the wrist" to employees reporting to work drunk,
while summarily discharging those using illegal substances.
1 18
In Mallinckrodt, Inc. 119 three employees in arbitration challenged their dis-
charge for their first offense of smoking marijuana on company property as an
excessive penalty in relation to the penalty for the first offense of alcohol use or
intoxication on company property.1 20 The arbitrator noted, " 'If the case is to
be viewed as concerned primarily [with] the Company's need to protect itself
against impairment of performance at the work place, it seems no question that
alcohol is at least on par with marijuana .... - 121 The arbitrator concluded
that "[a]lcoholism in industry, and as a social problem, is far more debilitating,
costly, and destructive than marijuana. There is no rational or reasonable basis
to treat them as distinct. Therefore to treat alcohol abuse with progressive disci-
pline and treat drug abuse with immediate discharge is improper. ' 122 The em-
ployees were reinstated. 123
Immediate discharge is not the only avenue open to an employer when
faced with an employee's positive drug test. Many experts argue that a drug-
abusing employee should be given a chance for rehabilitation rather than pun-
ishment.1 24 Presently, there are some 5,000 employee assistance programs
(EAPs) in existence in the United States that provide help to employees who are
referred by informed and alert supervisors, or who seek assistance volunta-
rily.12 5 Some employers waive disciplinary action provided that the employee
completes the EAP.12 6 Illinois Bell reports "an estimated savings of $459,000 in
reduced absences, accidents, and medical and disability following rehabilita-
tion.... Besides the cost savings, of course, are the human savings-the ability
to rehabilitate and restore employees to a healthful and productive status."'
2 7
A senior partner in a Chicago firm that advises corporations on drug policy
tells a story about a small company employing thirty people as an example of the
potential effects of employee drug use:
Unknown to company officials, the bookkeeper was a frequent user of
methaqualone (Quaaludes), who apparently spent much of her day in a
semi-trance. Checks were not deposited; invoices were not mailed, and
117. Mississippi River Grain Elevator, 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 200, 202 (1974).
118. Susser, supra note 114, at 45.
119. 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1261 (1983).
120. The penalty for first offense alcohol intoxication was a one day to two week suspension. Id.
at 1264.
121. Id. at 1266 (quoting Umpire Rolf Valtin in Umpire Decision N-69 in a case involving the
U.A.W. and General Motors).
122. Id. at 1266.
123. Id. at 1267.
124. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 434.
125. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 434.
126. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 434.
127. Rothstein, supra note 37, at 434-45.
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the books fell into terrible disarray. Even though the company was
doing a healthy business, it almost went bankrupt before the book-
keeper's drug use was discovered.1 28
Presumably either an applicant or a continuing-employee drug testing program
would have alerted company officials to their bookkeeper's drug problem. It is
equally likely, however, that careful supervision and performance review, impor-
tant parts of the average company's personnel policies apart from the drug prob-
lem, would also have informed company officials that their bookkeeper spent her
workdays in a "semi-trance."
Substance abuse is unquestionably a major problem in American society in
general and in the American workplace in particular. Random drug testing of
every employee from the company president to the janitor is not the solution,
however. Before an employer launches a widespread drug screening program, it
should consider the possibility of litigation and the potential effects on morale
and mutual trust between employer and employee. The off-hours activities of
employees traditionally have been private so long as job performance is not af-
fected, but current drug tests cannot be limited to monitor only on-the-job use
and impairment. Employers should balance the benefits they expect to receive
from a drug-testing program with the degree of intrusion into the dignity and
the private life of the employee. If an employer decides to proceed with drug
screening, by exercising care and caution it can limit, but not eliminate, the
potential for error and damage to an employee's reputation and the possibility of
costly litigation. Otherwise, the now sparse case law in the field of private em-
ployer drug screening is likely to multiply.
STEvEN O'NhAL TODD
128. Englade, supra note 1, at 22.
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APPENDIX
SUMMATION OF CONCERNS-A POLICY CHECKLIST FOR EMPLOYERS
1. Formal Policy: Plan a formal policy that deals not only with alcohol, con-
trolled substance use, and intoxication on the job, but that also details the proce-
dures by which the policy will be enforced. All employees should be aware of
and understand the rules and the consequences of violation. Enforcement must
be uniform and fair.
2. When to Test: Inform employees that they are subject to testing so that they
can make their own decisions as to use of alcohol and controlled substances. If
the job is more important than the "habit" then the employee can take steps to
control or eliminate use, if not, the employee can resign and avoid having to
carry the label "drug user" into his or her search for a new job.
3. Who Should Be Tested: Limit testing to "critical" jobs in which the safety
of the public, of the employee and co-workers, or of property absolutely pre-
cludes drug use in any form. Proper supervision of noncritical employees and
performance review should adequately deal with the problem of on-the-job drug
and alcohol use or intoxication for other workers. An alternative approach
would be to limit drug testing only to those situations in which there is probable
cause to suspect that an employee is impaired.
4. Collective Bargaining: Develop a policy in cooperation with union repre-
sentatives, when applicable, so that the union's support and cooperation can be
counted on in enforcement.
5. The Test Itself: Recognize the limitations in current testing technology:
levels of impairment and recency of use cannot be determined. Always obtain a
confirmation on positive first tests, preferably by means of a more sophisticated
technique. Consider that, whether the law recognizes privacy concerns or not,
many people consider testing to be intrusive. Current testing technology limita-
tions may place the employer in judgment of off-hours, off-premises activity that
does not affect on-the-job performance.
6. Chain of Custody: Use a reputable laboratory, preferably one that is accred-
ited and one that undergoes continuing review to limit false positives and false
negatives. Coordinate procedures with the lab so that chain of custody is pro-
tected, and eliminate the "middle man" if possible. Recognize that a mix-up in
the labelling or handling of test samples could have disastrous results for the
employee and employer. L
7. Need-to-know Test: Disseminate test results and conclusions on a need-to-
know basis only. Be prepared to link a positive test result to documented break-
downs in performance.
8. The Positive Test Result: Deal with alcohol and drug abuse equally. Impair-
ment on the job and the protection of persons and property should be the em-
ployer's first concern and not the legality or illegality of the substance that
caused an employee's impairment. Consider the possibility of offering assistance
to first offenders as opposed to discharge.
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